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\,
THE BUSINESS-STATE NEXUS AND ITS EFFECT ON INVESTMENT AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH IN CHILE AND VENEZUELA

The debate over rapid growth on the periphery has been dominated by studies of
outward v. inward models of industrial development. Comparative studies have tended to
focus on East Asia for examples of high growth based on outward development. By
contrast, Latin America--principally Mexico and Br~il--have typically provided examples of
low growth based on an inward development strategy .1 Aside from an outward-inward
economic orientation, explanatiom; for these outcomes often stressed two more variables.
One factor emphasized the role of state institutions in industrial policy, with high growth
requiring an active, interventionist state. In addition to this condition, analysts argued that
high growth also depended on close collaboration between bureaucrats and capitalists. 2
This paper argues that the impressive performance of the Chilean economy since 1986
suggests an alternative route to rapid, sustained, economic growth on the periphery. Since
the mid-1970s Chile has followed an outward-oriented economic strategy based on the
development of comparative advantage in extractive industries--with substantial participation
of foreign investment--and the creation of agile private capital markets and services. 3 Given
Chile's focus on markets rather than state intervention and industrial policy, the appellation
"liberal growth state" perhaps best describes the model. Chile's liberal growth state,
however, shares a fundamental characteristic with the East Asian "developmental state": it
too possesses a system of close collaboration between government and capitalists.
Given this central commonality, understanding the principal characteristics of close
collaboration in the Chilean case seems crucial for countries attempting to emulate the

Chilean model, such as Venezuela. This paper, then, compares high growth Chile to low
growth Venezuela in order to provide partial answers to the following questions. Which
forms of collaboration are functional to high economic growth and which are not? What
factors are important in their formation? Why does collaboration facilitate growth? Taking
each question in turn, the paper concentrates on the institutional, coalitional, and
international conditions that seem to influence effective v. ineffective collaboration. It then
compares Venezuela's restructuring project to Chile's in order to explore the hypothesis that
the process of economic adjustment itself may encourage "right" forms. of collaboration. A
concluding section reflects upon the similarities and differences between the East Asian
developmental state and the Chilean liberal growth state. Due to space constraints, the
.economic structures of Chile ap_d Venezuela are not discussed in any detail; although the
paper does examine levels of investment and rates of aggregate economic growth in order to
show the relative success of their respective economic development strategies.

THE IMPACT OF COLLABORATION ON INVESTMENT AND GROWTH
If collaboration between bureaucrats and capitalists has an impact on investment, the

first question to c:onsider is: which forms of collaboration stimulate high rates of investment
and economic growth, and which ones inhibit such outcomes? This question requires an
r

examination of the characteristics of the state and large-scale capital in established systems. ·
In this rather static context, the Chilean and Venezuelan cases suggest that institutional
factors are more important than social coalitions, although the latter seem necessary as well.
The following sections argue that the Chilean and Venezuelan cases suggest that
effective collaboration demands--among other factors--the interface of a centralized state
2

apparatus with centralized business associations capable of aggregating the interests of largescale capital. Aside from institutions, the latter characteristic also requires the•formation of a
dominant capitalist policy coalition,. one in which major capital.ists agree on basic economic
policy goals--the general framework within which sectoral peak associations then make their
specific demands. These institutional and social coalitional conditions facilitate the
productj.ve channeling of investment in accord with the economic strategy being pursued.
Moreover, the contrast between the two countries also shows that collaboration works best in
the presence of three additional characteristics. First, opportunities for rent-seeking and
corruption diminish when the price system rather than discretionary authority allocates most
resources. Second, collaboration is enhanced when policymakers and the centralized
business peak associations have open and fluid systems of communication between them in
both the formulation and implementation stages of the policymaking process, although not
necessarily in agenda setting. Third, collaboration works when policymakers and business
peak associations negotiate on the basis of shared technical criteria.

Business-State Networks, Investment, and Economic Growth in Chile, 1975-1992

Although Chile has enjoyed sustained rapid economic growth since 1986, an
examination of three policy periods over two distinct political regimes--,authoritarianism and
democracy--shows that some forms of collaboration between bureaucrats and capitalists were
more conducive to productive investment and sustained high GDP growth than others. The
following sections on Chile show that too much state autonomy in conjunction with a very
narrow group of capitalists can lead to damaging policies. By contrast a relatively less
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autonomous but centralized state, in conjunction with a fluid system of communication
between it and centralized peak associations, induces productive investment both under
authoritarianism and in democracy. 4

Business-State Networks under Radical Neoliberalism, 1975-1982
After the overthrow of socialist Salvador Allende in 1973, Chile's military
government implemented a neoclassical economic restructuring program in which
policymakers replaced the instruments of state intervention with the market. These
policymakers believed that markets allocated resources far more efficiently than bureaucrats,
and that markets disciplined economic agents to become more productive. They also
assumed that neutral, across-the-board policy instruments worked better than industrial policy
and discretionary state powers. 5 This neoliberal economic restructuring took place over
three distinct policy periods in authoritarian Chile: gradual, radical, and pragmatic. 6 Due to
space constraints the following sections only examine the latter two, and then analyze
continuities in the system of collaboration in the newly installed democratic regime.
Between 1975 and 1982, Chile experimented with radical neoliberal policies in the
construction of a liberal economy and society. Those policies included draconian economic
stabilization programs (shock therapy) and the rapid, thorough liberalization of capital
markets, prices, and trade, with little regard for their effects on industrial and agricultural
sectors that had difficulty adjusting. The introduction of a fixed exchange rate in 1979
became the center piece of a system of automatic economic adjustment, after which the top
policymakers believed that their main role would be to act as gatekeepers against interest
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groups that wanted to change the rules of the game.7 Market logic also informed social
policy in the new labor code, and the privatization of health insurance and pensions. 8
Economic performance until 1979 was not outstanding. Investment rates as a
proportion of GDP remained relatively low. ~anomic recovery was uneven in its sectorial
distribution as businessmen and landowners struggled to adjust to the imperatives of Chile's
comparative advantages. After 1979, in a period of high international liquidity, the fixed
exchange rate (which made the dollar very cheap) along with rules that stimulated dollar
indebtedness, encouraged financial speculation over productive investment. For a brief
period Chile's economy boomed. In the final analysis, however, its unregulated and
immature markets collapsed in 1982. A deep economic depression engulfed the nation as
GDP shrank 14% in one year, the financial system collapsed, the largest conglomerates were
broken up as their holding companies went under,· and unemployment climbed to 25 % of the
work force and eventually to over 30%. 9
A substantial literature covers the economic reasons for this economic debacle. It
focuses heavily on mistakes in the use of specific policy instruments. However, the specific
characteristics of the system of collaboration between government policymakers and top
capitalists also affected the outcome. The evidence suggests that damaging policies may
result when a highly autonomous state over-insulates ideologically rigid technocrats with
organic links to a narrow range of business interests operating outside the confines of
business peak associations. These characteristics can lead to harmful policies; policies too
skewed for healthy economic growth, and that, in Chile at least, ended in economic disaster.
The contrast to investment and growth patterns in the following policy period, within the

5

same autonomous state but with a different system of collaboration between business and
policymakers, is instructive: investment as a percentage of GDP increased steadily, and the
bulk of it was in productive enterprises rather than financial intermediation.
What were the characteristics of the system of collaboration between. the public and
private sectors between 1975 and 1982, and how did it contribute to economic disaster'? To
begin with, a highly autonomous state--Pinochet's system of one man rule--insµlated key
policymakers from virtually all pressure groups. 10 It also concentrated economic decision
making in government financial institutions: principally in the ministry of finance, and the
Central Bank, thus reducing points of access for business interest groups. The characteristics
of the economic policymakers themselves were also significant. They were not elite career
bureaucrats in a meritocratic system as they tend to be in the more successful dirigiste or
developmental states. Instead, they were a cohesive team of highly ideological technocrats
from civil society schooled in neoclassical economics--the so called Chicago boys because
many had studied at the University of Chicago in the 1960s. 11 Given their training, they
possessed a distinctive and rigid vision of policy goals and instruments. In the context of a
highly autonomous state, this textbook, inflexible, ideological approach led to economic
restructuring policies that showed no mercy for threatened economic sectors, and that
emphasized financial intermediation over·investment in production. 12

\

Many of the key Chicago boys had linkages to a narrow range of internationalist
conglomerates that tended to concentrate their holdings in financial intermediation, companies
that were internationally competitive, and trade. 13 Key economic ministries and institutions,
such as finance (top of the hierarchy), economy, the Central Bank, and the budget office
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were headed by men who had close ties to the Cruzat-Larrain, BHC, and Edwards
conglomerates. 14 These linkages gave the top directors of these internationalist
conglomerates--especially Cruzat-Larrain--privileged access to policy makers. That access
allowed them to discuss policy reforms with the policy makers. According to one
government official of the period, "The directors of privileged conglomerates participated
with increasing frequency in key policy meetings, and that clique eventually froze out all
opposition to their views. "15 In short the directors of those internationalist conglomerates
participated in setting the policy agenda and in policy formulation.
This relationship reinforced the ultimately damaging tendencies of economic policies
during this period. The privileged access of conglomerate executives in the policy
formulation stage helped them to play a vital role in policy implementation as well.. Their
aggressive strategy of corporate expansion at the expense of more traditional business groups
promoted the rapid growth of economic sectors in which Chile had comparative advantages.
Some also spent considerable sums rationalizing the manufacturing enterprises. Ultimately,
however, their activities were damaging because they based their expansion on highly
leveraged buy outs, and because they emphasized profiting from financial intermediation over
investment in production. That worked as long as there were no major shrinkages in
international liquidity and as long as international interest rates remained reasonably low .16
When those conditions changed, economic disaster struck Chile.
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Business-State Networks under Pragmatic Neoliberalism, 1983-1988

In the final analysis, Chile's economy did not prosper in the context of a highly
autonomous state coupled with a small cohesive group of inexperienced ideological
technocrats drawn from civil society, and a narrow network of contacts between them and
the executives of conglomerates in which they had been employed or linked to. Beginning in
1984, Chile's economy began to recover under a much more flexible approach to the
construction of a liberal economy, one that Chileans dubbed "pragmatic neoliberalism."
Policymakers in the financial institutions still preferred neutral policy instruments. But they
acknowledged that the state also had a duty to intervene in markets, particularly to stabilize
prices and boost domestic production, albeit with the most market-friendly instruments
available. Thus, the government saw to it that real exchange rates remained high, that
interest rates were reasonable, that agricultural and mining activities were protected by price
floors,. that manufacturers received protection from unfair external competition as well as
incentives to export. 17
Since state structure remained virtually the same, this second policy period highlights
the point that a different system of collaboration between capitalists and policymakers can
have a positive impact on investment and economic growth in a developing, liberal economy.
With respect to the state, the system of collaboration featured a mixture of experienced, well
trained career bureaucrats in financial ministries. These government agencies still stood at
the apex of the-hierarchy of economic bureaus. Moreover, between 1985 and 1988, top
economic policymakers (ministers of finance and central bankers) were drawn from the ranks
of experienced, technocratic, flexible, civil service officers. As in the previous policy
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period, they set general policy guidelines, which continued to emphasize economic
liberalism. Beneath them, however, prominent businessmen headed the sectoral ministries
(economy for industry and commerce, agriculture, mining, and public works). Their
economic interests suggest that they were carefully chosen for possessing a mixture of
international and domestic market oriented economic interests. Thus, it was unlikely that
they would adopt policies that zealously pursued one activity to the exclusion of other.
Moreover, those ministers were not so closely linked to specific conglomerates.
The ministers maintained fluid channels of communication with cohesive and highly
representative business peak associations at two levels. First, the umbrella organization of
large-scale business associations (the Confederation for Production and Commerce, CPC)
routinely discussed exchange rate, interest rate, and general monetary policy with the
minister of finance and the central bankers. According, to Jorge Fontaine, president of the
CPC in the mid-1980s, "We had excellent access to ministers, even the president himself.
The ministers were much more receptive to our point of view once the Chicago boys were no
longer in charge. "18 Second, sector-specific peak associations participated in formulation
and implementation stages of the policy process in close contact with the ministries in. charge
of their sector. In the words of the director of studies of the Chilean Construction Chamber:
"As a condition of accepting the ministry of finance, Modesto Collados demanded that he
have a free hand in the implementation of the triennial plan that he had drawn up when he
was president of the Chamber. "19 At both the general and sector specific level, then, the
public and private sectors for the most part negotiated on the basis of technical criteria rather
than personal favors, clientelism, or political threats.

9

..
This new system of collaboration contributed to the adoption of policy instruments

that facilitated economic recovery from the 1982-83 debacle. That recovery began in 1984
and became sustained as of 1986. The results in terms of levels of investment and economic
growth proved impressive. Overall investment rose steadily from 17 % of GDP in 1986 to
20% in 1988, and the GDP grew by an average of about 8 per cent. 20 Much of it was in
productive enterprises in agriculture (packing companies) and industry, both internationally
and domestic market oriented (timber, fishing, manufacturing, communications). The
financial sector recovered its health, but no longer overshadowed other activities. Foreign
direct investment· made up a significant part of the capital sunk into the Chilean economy.
Much was devoted to wholly owned subsidiaries (packing companies, mining enterprises, -and
timber companies, and financial corporations). A substantial proportion, however, arrived in
the form of joint ventures with the holding companies of Chile's largest and best established
surviving conglomerates, again in those same general industries, including fishing
activities. 21

Business-State Networks in Democratic Chile. 1990-1992
The democratic opposition that took over the government after Pinochet's defeat in
the plebiscite of October 1988, had pledged its commitment to the development of a liberal
economy and society in Chile during the transition to democracy. It explicitly promised not
to tamper with the general economic model--pragmatic liberalism--developed during the last
years. of the dictatorship. Moreover, once in office, the new democratic administration
retained the essential features of the previous form of collaboration between government
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policymakers and business peak associations. The new policymakers believed this was the
best way to maintain investor confidence.
Top policymakers continue to be technically very capable people. And, although the
system of collaboration is not institutionalized, they too, regularly consult and negotiate with
the leadership of business peak associations on major economic policy issues from the policy
forl}lulation stage on down. 22 Taxation; labor, and foreign exchange policies are among
some of the major initiatives that have been handled that way. Channels of communication
are also open for discussion on matters of lesser importance. For example, one director of
the Industrial Development Society (SFF) confided, "On matters large and small, we have
excellent access to the ministries. All I have to do is pick up the phone and we arrange a
meeting right away. "23 By the same token, the then president of the Confederation of
Production and Commerce said, "Tax and labor code changes were negotiated settlements
with the government. "24 The business peak associations themselves continue to be highly
representative of the interests of the large-scale business sector. For each policy initiative
they set up

a technical commission that studies government proposals and makes observations

that are then negotiated with the policymakers, and/or with legislators if it is a proposed law ..
According to a member of the executive committee of the SPF, "We meet often to
technically evaluate policy proposals. We then make counter proposals and accompany our
directors when they negotiate with government officials. Ever since we began discussing
policy on a more technical basis we have had better relations with government, and better
results. "25
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Some of the characteristics of the top government policymakers have changed from
the days of pragmatic neoliberalism under the military government. The top ranks are no
longer composed of a combination of career bureaucrats and businessmen. Instead, most are
highly trained economists from think tanks linked to the major political parties that formed
the opposition bloc. 26 This suggests that having businessmen in the cabinet is not key for
investor confidence in Chile. A commitment to building a liberal economy and society,
along with technical capability, and the certainty that they will be consulted in policy
formulation and implementation, however, does seem to be important. Moreover, the
combination of professional technocratic. style in government with technically capable, highly
representative business peak associations appears to restrain rent-seeking and corruption.
This arrangement has contributed to impressive economic results. Investment
continues to rise steadily and is reported at 25 % of GDP in 1992, and the economy has
enjoyed sustained high aggregate growth rates of around 7% per year since 1986.27
Moreover, Chile's liberal economy sets relatively high performance standards for industry.
As a result, existing price supports and other sectoral policies are set at levels that only
provide a minimum of protection to keep businesses from succumbing to predatory
international competition. Thus, the price system demands high performance from industry
and keeps rent-seeking and corruption around what protection and subsidies exists to a
minimum.
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I

Business-State Networks, Investment, :and Economic Growth in Venezuela, 1959-1988
I
I

I

The case of democratic Venezue\a between 1958 and 1988 provides a sharp contrast
I

I

to Chile between 1973 and 1992. During those thirty years it was an example of the Latin
I

American democratic, populist, clientelist state. Thus it had a commitment to economic

!

growth, nationalism, and social equity. In addition to these differences, Venezuela also
I

followed an import substitution industri~ization (ISI) model of economic development, with
I

its attendant regulations, controls, and emphasis on discretionary state power to develop
i

!

industry. Moreover, Venezuela was also blessed--or cursed--with oil, which was the heart of
j

the country's economy. 28 In this conteit, in spite of increasing oil revenues and notable

I

advances in the ratio of investment to GDP, overall economic performance remained
sluggish. While investment rates rose ffrom around 10.5 % of GDP in the 1960s to around
I

25-30% in the late 1970s, average GDP growth was only around 4% in the 1960s and 3% in
I
1

the 1970s. 29

To be sure, clientelism, over-reliance on a single commodity for exports,. the
economic distortions of ISI, and populist social policy all had an impact on the sluggishness
I

of GDP growth in spite of the more than doubling of investment.30 In addition to these
I

'

l

factors, however, the specific charact~ristics of state institutions, of the top policymakers, the
i

nature of business peak associations,· ~d the system of collaboration between capitalists and
I
I

the state also played a role. They pr1vided opportunities for rent-seeking and corruption that
I

had a negative impact on the product~~ity of investment.
I

To the degree that collaboratiqn between the state and capitalists is important for

i
investment and economic growth, the Chilean case suggested that one of the keys to the
I

i
I

l

I
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successful system of collaboration is the concentration of decision making power at the top
levels of government and business. Thus, the state should have a well-defined hierarchy of
economic ministries headed by technically proficient personnel. In the private sector,
technically sophisticated highly representative business peak associations deal with
government technocrats. Thus, while there is ample access to government by business, the
points of access, the actors, and the "currency" of the discussion are all predefined, and well
codified.
The situation in Venezuela, however, was virtually the reverse from that of Chile
where highly cohesive state institutions bargained with a fairly cohesive private sector.
Fragmentation and particularism within both the government and the private sector seems to
have been its main characteris.tic. 31 This made Venezuela's economic policymaking
institutions more porous than Chile's and facilitated rent-seeking, corruption, and private
deals on the part of capitalists and government decision makers alike. It also encouraged
competing particularistic coalitions of state institutions and capitalists pitted against others. 32
Moreover, also unlike Chile, until the early 1980s public investment (from oil revenues)
drove Venezuelan private investment. The government targeted industries for growth and
offered subsidized credits and other incentives for their development. Private investment
followed. But those government resources were not conditioned on expectation of better
performance by capitalists. Finally, successive administrations constantly redefined the
priority sectors. As a result, Venezuelan capitalists continually-diversified their hold1ngs in
new 1ndustties where they had little experience, and favored short term gains over long .range
planning. These factors generally had a negative impact on industry performance. 33
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In the context of the myriad regulations and controls associated with the ISI
development model, the fragmented system of collaboration between government
policymakers and capitalists encouraged rent-seeking and corruption. The director of a
leading pulp and paper company put it this way: "We lobby government officials by offering
stock options, a job when they get out of office, and other incentives. "34 The president of
an insurance group added, "The most important businessmen regularly strike private deals
with politicians over prices, contracts, and exceptions to policies they don't agree with for
their firms. "35 On the government side, top policymakers could be either party politicians
or important businessmen. Such men directed the ministry of finance, the Central Bank, the
ministry of development, the planning ministry, the Venezuelan Investment Fund, and the
ministry of mines and energy (oil). All of these agencies made important investment
decisions in a relatively decentralized manner. Their goals were sometimes in conflict as
well-, By the same token business peak associations were fractionated and weak. 36 Their
weakness primarily stemmed from fact that they did not really speak for large-scale
business. 37 · The leadership of the peak associations was not composed of businessmen with
executive capacity. They mainly worked out the details of policy implementation, especially
in regulations and prices. 38
Given the relative lack of importance of business peak associations, the main channels
of access and communication between the state and capitalists were on a personal level
between large-scale businessmen and ministers of state. Business peak associations might
agree on a general position on a given problem with government officials. Then, the most
important businessmen of a particular industry would privately seek out their friends in the
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respective ministry. 39 They would either negotiate an exception for their firms, or they
blocked or modified proposed regulations or prices for the entire industry in accord with
their individual needs. The insurance group president put it this way: "The peak associations
work out a position. Then the owners of the largest corporations in the sector sabotage it by
making private arrangements with friendly politicians. We won't get anything done until this
situation is reversed. 1140
Although inefficient, this system did lead to increasing investment and economic
growth, albeit sluggish at times, as long as oil revenues were sufficient to drive the
Venezuelan economy. With the debt crisis of the early 1980s, the end of the fixed exchange
rate for the bolivar, plummeting oil prices, and increasing economic instability, Venezuelan
capitalists stopped investing. Capital flight, much of it through corrupt and illegal
movements, reached scandalous levels. 41 Private sector investment levels dropped below
public sector investment for the first time in democratic Venezuela. 42 Public sector
investment also declined as fiscal spending concentrated on fueling populist social spending
'

programs or bailouts for financially strapped companies with good political ccmtacts. 43

THE EMERGENCE OF SYSTEMS OF COLLABORATION

The previous discussion of the Chilean and Venezuelan cases raises several questions
that emphasize the dynamic rather than the static dimensions of collaboration between
bureaucrats and capitalists. Two of those questions will be discussed in this section of the
essay. Why did successful collaboration emerge in Chile after 1982, and a less workable-although serviceable--system of collaboration appear in Venezuela after 1959? What
contributed to the continuity of the system of collaboration ·after the transition to democracy
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in Chile; why did it collapse in Venezuela after 1982? The question of the effects of
Venezeula's economic restructuring program will be considered in a following section.
From this more dynamic perspective, then, the following sections argue that social
coalitions and international factors acquire greater relevance than institutional factors in the
process that gives birth to particular forms of collaboration; International economic and
political change can break up the bargains that sustain institutional arrangements. This
unleashes a process of conflict and cooperation between social groups in the search for new
policy coalitions and institutions. Thus, in Chile, the end of high international liquidity
broke up a narrow business coalition that supported radical neoliberal economic
restructuring. A new business coalition formed and policy changed somewhat in the confines
of the same state structure. That coalition held together in the transition to democracy, made
a deal with the opposition, and the same basic economic policies are in force today in
democratic rather than authoritarian Chile. 44 By the same token, in Venezuela changes in
the international economic system since the 1980s, and political pressure from Washington
(the offer of a bilateral free trade agreement), have forced business to reconsider its
participation in the populist coalition forged at the end of the 1950s. Venezuelan capitalists
are engaged in their own process of conflict and cooperation as they struggle to construct a
new policy alliance. All of this within the confines of the same democratic regime.

How "Successful" Collaboration Emerged and was Retained in Chile
As previously seen, Chile's authoritarian regime--bent on forging a liberal state--gave
birth to a "successful" form of collaboration between capitalists and bureaucrats between
1983 and 1988. What factors help to explain why the previous "unhealthy," system of
17

collaboration (which after all was briefly successful between 1979 and 1982) gave way to the
new "successful" one, and why was it retained in democracy? To begin with, an external
shock, the end of high international liquidity, destroyed the viability of radical neoliberal
economic restructuring and the narrow capitalist coalition that supported. 45 Faced with a
closed military government that essentially refused to change the basic policy instruments of
radical neoliberalism, Chilean capitalists banded together in search of an alternative set of
policy instruments that might put Chile back on the path to economic growth, although still
within the framework of a liberal state and economy .46
International economic crisis and a highly autonomous military regime may have
forced Chilean capitalists to collective action, but it was insufficient to build an effective
system of collaboration between them ,and the state. A political crisis, a threat to the project
of authoritarian liberal state formation--specifically, a challenge to General Augusto
Pinochet's position as head of state--finally induced a change in the system of collaboration
between the public and private sectors. 47 Among other concerns, Pinochet and his advisors
worried that some important business groups might be persuaded to join the moderate
political opposition that had gathered strength as a result of the economic crisis.
As the economic crisis deepened in 1983 and 1984, the main opposition bloc, Alianza
Democratica (AD), made overtures to disgruntled business groups. The idea was to woo
some important capitalists away from Pinochet and form a broad multi-class alliance against
the dictatorship. To that end, at a time when Pinochet was still backing Chicago boys, AD
promised to adopt the main policy proposals of the pragmatic neoliberal capitalist
coalition.48 AD, however, also proposed greater state intervention in the economy,
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especially in form of public ownership. 49 If successful in its plans; AD hoped to speed up
the transition to democracy by three years (1985 instead of 1988), with changes to the
authoritarian constitution of 1980, and to negotiate this transition with the military, but
without Pinochet.
In order to truncate tµe formation of such a broad cross-class coalition against him,
the available evidence suggests that Pinochet began to incorporate businessmen into the
cabinet in 1983 and 1984 so that they could implement their economic recovery plan. 50
That action laid the groundwork for the system of collaboration that emerged in 1985. For it
was then that Pinochet replaced businessmen with technocrats in key government financial
institutions because sectoral tensions among capitalists occupying economic ministries had
become untenable. But he retained businessmen at the head. of sectoral ministries, as well as
'

"

the system of close consultation with business peak associations that they had encouraged in
1984.
The reequilibration of the military government strengthened the process of liberal
state formation in Chile by robbing AD of potential capitalist support. As a result, the
opposition's challenge to the authoritarian 1980 constitution and to changes in the economic
model collapsed. Thus, after pragmatic neoliberalism took shape between 1984 and 1986,
the opposition promised to retain that economic model virtually without modification in
return for the opportunity to mount an electoral challenge to Pinochet under the conditions
stipulated by the 1980 constitution. This meant expunging references to public enterprise and
toning down the redistributional rhetoric in favor of a more assistentialist approach to welfare
issues. 51
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Thus, in the context of a stabilizing international economy, the power relatioris
between the opposition and authoritarians during the transition to democracy influenced the
retention of the general features of both pragmatic neoliberalism and the system of
collaboration. After winning the plebiscite of 1988 and the presidential elections of 1989,
the ·opposition maintained the system of close consultation with business leaders that had been
forged in the last years of the dictatorship. The new administration did so for the express
purpose of increasing the confidence of capitalists in the government's promise to retain the
pragmatic neoliberal economic model. Capitalists would thus be induced to continue to
invest. 52 In the words of Alejandro Foxley (currently finance minister) shortly before the
plebiscite: "We have given businessmen every assurance that we will respect their
fundamental interests. We will not countenance a return to populist policies. Chile needs to
retain the conditions that foster private sector investment because that's the only path to
healthy development. 1153
But the transition to democracy strengthened the system of collaboration in ways that
went beyond the retention of what already existed. Since Chile's authoritarian regime never
collapsed, the democratic opposition sought ways in which to negotiate the political
transition. Thus, as early as 1984, AD strove to incorporate businessmen in policy
negotiations. 54 The reequilibration of Pinochet's regime reinforced the commitment to a
consensual style of policymaking of AD and its successor, the Concertaci6n de Partidos por
la Democracia. As a result, this style has been.a key characteristic of policymakjng in
Patricio Aylwin's administration under the guidance of chief of staff Edgardo Boenninger,
who had led AD's initial efforts in this realm in 1984. The central point of this consensual
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style is to promote national reconciliation by avoiding the conflictual policymaking styles of
the past. In this effort, the interests of capital have weighed more in the balance than any
other group's. 55 In short, the current system of collaboration is the business/government
nexus of the consensual politics of redemocratized Chile; born of the power relations between
authoritarians and democrats in the transition to democracy.

The Emergence and Collapse of Venezuela's System of Collaboration

The Venezuelan case reinforces the importance of factors such as the history of state
formation, social coalitions, and the international economy in the rise and fall of systems of
collaboration. Within Latin America, Venezuela may be considered a case of the late, late
creation of a populist, clientelist, democratic capitalist state within the context of an import
substitution industrialization policy. Venezuela forged a typical populist coalition that later
encountered their typical problems. It was a broad-based multiclass social coalition of
industrialists, middle classes, and organized urban and rural labor, mediated by a populist
political party. 56 Distributive and redistributive policies held the coalition together. In the
Venezuelan case, expanding oil revenues provided the resources for such policies. 57
In the formation of Venezuela's populist state, the system of collaboration between
business and economic policymakers emerged as the result of a pact forged between the
major political parties (that represented the interests of the middle and popular classes) and
businessmen. Significantly, individual capitalists instead of .peak associations represented
business interests. The resulting pact explicitly recognized capitalist development based on
an ISI model. This gave Venezuelan businessmen confidence that'future policy would
generally serve their interests. 58 The process of forging a populist state ensured that the
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relationship between capitalists and policymakers conformed to the clientelistic and
distributive nature of that state.
The system more or less worked as long as oil revenues could sustain the distributive
policies that held the coalition together. That condition, however, changed apace with the
international economy in the early 1980s. Business abandoned the coalition via massive
capital flight. 59 Unlike the crisis of populism elsewhere, however, Venezuelan capitalists
did not clamor for military intervention nor did the economic crisis alone forge a policy
consensus. In Chile, international economic crisis and a closed state spurred capitalists to
collective action in the design of an alternative economic program'. But the fragmented,
porous character of the populist, clientelistic state in Venezuela provided strong disincentives
to collective action among their capitalists. In general, it seems that political crisis--threats
to the democratic regime--move them to collective action more quickly than economic crisis.
That had been the case in the early and mid 1960s, when important capitalists with decision
making power took an interest in the management of business· peak a~sociations. 60 Once the
threat was gone they abandoned them. As evidence presented in the next section suggests,
the same seems to be occurring in the aftermath of two coup attempts and the impeachment
of president Carlos Andres Perez in June 1993.

PATTERNS OF COLLABORATION AND THE FORGING OF THE LIBERAL
STATE lN VENEZUELA

Although by no means optimal for the productivity of investment, Venezeula's system
of collaboration between bureaucrats and capitalists at least was not a disincentive to
investment until 1982-83. This suggests that the requirements of collaboration change over
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time. A change in the international economy--the long term price of oil and the availability
of cheap foreign savings--contributed among other factors to the neoliberal economic
restructuring program that Venezuela began in 1988. Based on available evidence, a
comparison between the Venezuelan and Chilean experiences suggests that the process of
liberal economic restructuring itself may contribute to growth-inducing collaboration between
capitalists and government policymakers. Perhaps state officials have to "listen" more to
capitalists because in liberal economies they, not the state, are responsible for the bulk of
investment.
There are striking parallels between Chile and Venezuela in the sequence and form of
the establishment of the liberal state in economic restructuring programs and their impact on
the system of collaboration between policymakers and capitalists. In Venezuela, as was the
case in Chile, during the initial period of adjustment the president--Carlos Andres Perez-appointed a narrow group of businessmen and technocrats interested in radical liberal
economic restructuring to top policymaking positions. 61 Mostly by decree, they pushed
through price and trade liberalization along with privatization and a high real exchange
rate. 62 Again as in Chile, the capitalists involved were associated with large conglomerates
that concentrated their holdings in internationally competitive industries, some had long
supported tariff reform. Many of these businessmen/technocrat policymakers were "on loan"
to the government, as Venezuelans phrased it. Moreover, quite a few had been associated
with a working group established in the early 1980s--the Grupo Roraima--dedicated to
finding a liberal solution to the crisis of the populist state.
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If the relationship between a narrow band of capitalists, technocrats, and the president

proved fragile in authoritarian Chile, it was even more so in democratic Venezuela. Unlike
Chile, those adversely affected by economic adjustment and restructuring had means with
which to defend themselves: the congress. They stalled supporting legislation intended to
deepen privatization and market liberalization. 63 With the impeachment of Carlos Andres
Perez in May of 1993 the fate of the reforms remains uncertain.
Has the process of economic restructuring in Venezuela also restructured the longer
term relationship between the state and the private sector along Chilean lines? Success in
Chile meant two things. One, the formation of a pragmatic capitalist policy coalition by
centralized business peak associations that represented the interests of large-scale capital.
Second, those peak associations regularly participated in the policymaking process. Although
the evidence is inclusive) there are signs of comparable trends emerging in Venezuela.
In some respects, Venezuelan capitalists in the early 1990s and their pusiness peak
associations have responded similarly to those in Chile a decade ago. A Venezuelan version
of "pragmatic" neoliberalistn is struggling to emerge. In the main, large-scale businessmen
have begun a campaign to retain what they consider valuable of CAP's "radical" neoliberal
program and to add nuances to aspects they consider more damaging. The battle lines in
Venezuela, of course, are sectoral. · All seem in favor of high real exchange rates, the price
system, "managed" interest rates, and privatization. Commerce wanti, to retain low tariffs.
Industry wants more tariff protection. As in Chile, the discussion centers on how to achieve
a measure of protection within the confines of neoc.lassical economics, and, again, antidumping regulations stand at the center of the debate. Meariwhile, in another replay of Chile
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a decade ago, agriculture wants price supports, and may get them. However, unlike Chile,
the financial sector (banking and insurance) is fighting legislation that would open them up to
external competition. The outcome was still unclear in July, 1993.64
In Chile, the success of the policy coalition and its linkages to the state hinged on
bargaining between centralized, authoritative, p~ associations. Are Venezuelan peak
associations overcoming their fragmentation and weakness? In some respects the answer is atentative yes. Faced with a political crisis--the threat of a populist military coup or elected
government that would reverse policies they riow support--large scale capitalists have begun
to take an interest in their peak associations, and to use them as a vehicle for negotiating
policy change. 65 Although the trend is tenuous and has suffered from backsliding, it is
nonetheless recognizable. If they hammer out their version of a "pragmatic neoliberal"
policy coalition, they would then negotiate a new pact to replace the Pacto de_Punto Fijo of
the late 1950s and the Social pact of the 1980s. 66
Meanwhile, the bulk of the investments for Venezuela's current high growth levels
are coming from abroad. The absence of a cohesive capitalist policy coalition capable of
negotiating a new form of articulation to the state has made the Venezuelan private sector
very cautious. They are not certain of the rules of the game and most do not have the funds _
to gamble in the long term. 67 If a new arrangement between the Venezuelan private sector
and the political parties and unions emerges ·around a consensus over the form of the liberal
state and the general economic model, then Venezuelan investor confidence may reemerge as
it did in the wake of the fall of Perez Jimenez in the 195bs. The vice president of a leading
business consulting firm characterized the situation in the following manner. "Venezuelan

25

investment will pick up once the private sector is convinced that the basic economic policy
orientation will not be subject to change by incoming administrations (gobiemo de
tumo). 116s

WHY DOES COLLABORATION INDUCE INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH?

Why does collaboration induce investment and economic growth? In addition to Peter
Hall'_s idea of the interplay of learning and conflict, the Chilean and Venezuelan cases·
suggest that the struggles involved in establishing a successful economic policy coalition also
' influences that outcome. 69 Capitalist participation in two areas seem to have a more
investment inducing effect than the actual institutional form of collaboration. One of them is
their involvement in the determination of both the economic policy agenda and its
instruments--that is, setting the basic rules of the game.
.

This activity calms the fears of
'

capitalists by reducing their uncertainty over the fate of their investment. The other
important factor is their role in the design of the form of collaboration itself. This aspect
reinforces their confidence that policy in general will favor their interests, or that they will
be able to soften adverse policy to acceptable dimensions. Thus, in Chile the combined
economic and political crises of 1982-83 forged a cohesive capitalist policy coalition- that then
negotiated policy and the form of collaboration directly with the highest levels of the military
government. In Venezuela, political crisis in the late 1950s brought political parties and
capitalists together in order to negotiate the specific rules of the game they could all live
under. Those accords then shaped the specific forms of collaboration. Thus, with ruies of
the game set in ways acceptable to them, and with systems of collaboration that reinforced
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those agreements, capitalists felt secure enough to invest. The productivity of that
investment, of course depended on other factors.

THE LIBERAL GROWTH STATE: IMPLICATIONS OF AN ALTERNATIVE
MODEL OF STATE FORMATION

Arguing against the neoclassical economic tide, a number of studies of the East Asian
cases of rapid growth on the periphery have stressed the importance of the role of the
interventionist state. 70 In response to such arguments, market enthusiasts might point to the
Chilean case in order to vindicate their faith 1n the liberal model of development. In reality,
these somewhat contrasting models probably only imply that there is more than one pathway
from the periphery~ to use Stephan Haggard's apt phrase.71 One path emphasized state
intervention and an economic model that concentrated on industrialization based on the
exploitation and development of competitive advantages in manufacturing. The other path
featured less direct state intervention and focused on extractive industries rooted in the
nation's comparative advantages.
Despite these rather stark differences, Chile shares with East Asia what Ziya Onis has
identified as two additional key features of the developmental state.72 The first one is a
single minded emphasis on economic growth to the virtual exclusion of all other values.
Thus, although other values such as equity and participation cannot be completely ignored in
democratic Chile, they are nevertheless firmly subordinated to the requirements of economic
growth. . Close collaboration between top economic policymakers and capitalists is the second
common feature of the developmental and liberal growth states. Given these similar
characteristics and successful growth rates, Chile may be considered a model of the "liberal
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growth state." Moreover it is a model touted by the "Washington consensus," and
increasingly emulated by other Latin American countries.
A comparison between the liberal growth state and the developmental state suggests
the following hypothesis. A single minded dedication to growth and an effective form of
collaboration between capitalists and policymakers seems to be more crucial for rapid growth
on the periphery than either the degree of state intervention or whether rapid growth is based
on industrialization. Thus, the need for the latter two elements probably depends upon which
outward growth strategy a country adopts, which, in tum, is partially related to factor
endowments. 73 Nations pursuing rapid industrialization seem to benefit from greater direct
state intervention. The state must have the instruments to effectively carry out industrial
policy. By the same token, however, the liberal growth state must also possess sufficient
capacity to create and enforce the institutiqns that permit markets to function. - All of this, of
course, in the context of international political economy that favors outward oriented
development strategies, whether they are industrially focused or not.
The comparison between Chile and Venezuela also suggests that the institutional
requirements of collaboration and the characteristics of the major actors need not be the same
as those present -in the East Asian developmental state for rapid growth to take place. On the
side of the policymakers, studies of East Asia have emphasized the importance of a
meritocratic, technocratic, career civil service. 74 Chile, by contrast, drew the majority of
its top policymakers from civil society. Nevertheless, there is a common core to both
systems: policymakers are flexible; non-ideological, technically proficient, and imbued with a
professional ethos. In Venezuela, where this was not the case in any systematic way,
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economic growth suffered-.,.and not always for lack of investment. The cases also suggest
that a well defined hierarchy among the economic ministries helps technocrats to function
properly: greater autonomy for financial and planning ministries at the top of the hierarchy,
and perhaps

abit more porousness in sectorial ministries whose functions are more

circumscribed by the higher instances.
With respect to the characteristics of top capitalists some of the East Asian-cases75
and Chile suggest that collaboration works better when business interests are highly
centralized as well. The Venezuelan case provided an interesting contrast. It showed that a
high degree of fragmentation and a lack of support of business peak organizations by to}? _
capitalists was not functional to successful collaboration. Moreover, in spite of the
similarities between the East Asian and Chilean cases on this score, there seemed to be an
important difference as well. In East Asia the state apparently dealt mainly with the heads of
major conglomerates, whereas in Chile successful collaboration required the participation of
centralized business peak associations that enjoyed the full backing of the major
conglomerates. Significantly, when only a few conglomerates participated in policy~aking,
the resulting policy ultimately proved to be disastrous. Of course, it is difficult to sort out
whether the form of business representation or the characteristics of the policymakers were
more at fault. In short, effective centralization of top capitalists seems necessary for
successful collaboration; although whether by conglomerates or business peak associations
seems to be contingent on other factors which merit further study.

In addition to these factors, this paper has also argued that relatively static
institutional conditions are not sufficient for understanding the circumstances under which
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collaboration. cpntributes. to investwent .and growth. The comparison between Chile and
Venezuela suggests that the dynanµcs of shifting.capitalist coalitions. and their·relationship,to
the state are crucial as well. First of all, strong ,nati~nal capital participation in investment
occurred· when capitalists organized in a cohestve economic policy coalition played a central
role in, determining the economic model and its basic policy instruments. Moreover, that
experience.
the basic rules of the game· for
collaboration between the private .and
. also defined
.
.
public sectors. It-niay,well be that this.p¥ticipation in: setting the· rules of the game.is what
provides ~tin American capitalists with sufficient confidence to risk substantial investments,
particularly. during the process, of ~onomic restructuring that is necessary for the
establishment of the libenµ growth state. In the process of n,egotiation wi~ capitalists,
policymalc~rs may also learn which policy instruments are acceptable and which need to be
refined.
These observations imply that the requirements for successful collaboration change
.

.

over time along with shifts in the dominant.policy coalition.. What prompts changes.in those
coalitions and the articulation with the state that they. had fotged? I argued that i.ijternational
economic .factors and domesµc political factors are vital in provoking changes in the
.composition of dominant-social coalitions in Latin America, and hence, the form of
collaboration.

External shocks· can certainly initiate the undermining of reigning policy

coalitions~ as·was the case in Chile ~d Venezuela iri the early 1980s.76 Internal political
'

.

shocks.that follow apparei:itly help the process along. In Venezuela, the threat of a coup \>y
populist military .forces and their allies in the early 1990s. moved the business sector to rally
·behind· some of the .neoliberal reforms already implemented, principally price liberalization
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and privatization. In Chile, Pinochet responded to a the demands of a new capitalist
coalition only in the presence of political threat against his personal rule. Moreover, in the
context of a generally expanding world economy and favorable oil prices, internal political
crises alone may pr~ipitate changes in policy coalitions, as was the case with the Pacto de
Punto Fijo in Venezuela in the late 1950s. Meanwhile, as of the late 1980s in Chile
international economfo and internal political stability are contributing to the expansion of the
.pragmatic neoliberal coalition to include middle classes and a substantial portion of
unorganized labor.
This paper has concentrated on the characteristics of successful and not so .successful
collaboration in Chile and Venezuela and how those forms of collaboration arose. Some of
the key features of the discussion and the framing of its terms, however, raise worrisome
questions. The question of economic efficiency has tended to dominate mainstream academic
discussions of economic development on the periphery for some time now. Thus, the current
concern with the issue of collaboration is defined in terms of rates of investment and
economic growth. Not too surprisingly the evidence reveals that "successful" collaboration
requires single-minded dedication to providing a good business climate, of favoring growth to
the exclusion of other values. This focus crowds out other questions such as, what are
acceptable trade-offs between equity and growth in developing countries?77 How can
capitalists be induced to continue investing once governments begin to address the social
question?78 Questions such as these suggest rich avenues for new research related to the
issue of collaboration. If capitalists are so strong now that efficiency questions dominate to
the exclusion of other values, realistic alternatives to the liberal conception social equity are
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sorely needed. 79 Once those alternatives are specified, and since Latin American capitalists
tend to strongly resist efforts at social reform, new research can begin to explore if there are
forms of collaboration that can help to ease the fears of capitalists when social policy
receives serious attention. Additional, complementary research can then address the
conditions that might favor the adoption of such forms of collaboration.
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